Biometric technologies are routinely used in the response to refugee crises with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) aiming to have all refugee data from across the world in a central population registry by the end of 2019.
. "The biometric assemblage: surveillance, experimentation, profit and the measuring of refugee bodies", Television and New Media, vol. 20, DOI: 10.1177/1527476419857682 4 for food distributions. Biometrics converge with other innovations to advance the 'digital identity' and financial inclusion of refugees (UNHCR 2018) revealing the increasing collaboration between humanitarian agencies, states and the private sector.
After defining biometrics, AI and blockchain as an assemblage, the article will discern the distinct, yet overlapping logics which drive the adoption of these technologies.
The paper will then review the implementation of biometric registrations in the humanitarian sector from the early 2000s until 2019. The acceleration of the rate of biometric registrations among refugee populations takes place despite the significant risks which are heightened as a result of technological convergence. After outlining the serious risks associated with the biometric assemblage, the paper will consider who benefits from biometric registrations and related 'digital identity' initiatives. The article highlights the logics of capitalism and solutionism as key forces shaping the biometric assemblage. This is illustrated in the idea of the refugee camp as a testing site for new technologies. In so doing the biometric assemblage depoliticises displacement and heightens power inequalities between refugees and humanitarian agencies.
The article is primarily based on the analysis of recent policy documents and industry reports including internal UN audit reports, which reveal the current discourses about biometrics in the humanitarian sector. The analysis of the secondary material is supplemented by ongoing empirical research on the broader topic of digital innovation and data practices in the humanitarian sector which includes 35 interviews and ethnographic fieldwork (conducted between July 2016 and January 2019) with humanitarian officers, donors, volunteers, consultants, software developers, private entrepreneurs as well as other stakeholders. 1 The purpose of the article is not to fully report on this research: the interview material is used to illustrate the notion of the biometric assemblage, the associated heightened risks, the reasons driving these developments and their implications.
The identification assemblage: biometrics, blockchain and artificial intelligence
Biometrics is a technology for measuring, analysing and processing a person's physiological characteristics, such as: fingerprints, iris, facial patterns, voice, hand geometry and DNA among others. Contemporary biometrics use digital technology, but despite the popular view that biometrics is a recent phenomenon, the desire to read identity from human bodies has a long history which can be traced to the now discredited subjects of anthropometry, phrenology and bertillonage in the nineteenth century (Magnet 2011) . The biometric industry grew out of the US prison-industrial complex in the mid-to late twentieth century, which reveals the close association between biometrics and the control and disciplining of marginalized populations (Magnet 2011) . The biometric industry boomed after 9/11, which represented a tremendous business opportunity (Magnet 2011, 120) , signalling a 'realignment of national security interests with the profit of private companies' (Monahan 2010, 37) .
The sector has continued to grow and was valued at $14.4bn in 2017 with expectations to almost triple by 2023. 2 Biometric data are used for identification and verification purposes.
Identification checks a biometric record against a large database of biometric profiles (one-to-many comparison) while verification checks a live record against the entry already in the system (one-to-one authentication). Identification processes entail a higher risk of false matches than verification (The Engine Room and Oxfam 2018).
Humanitarian agencies commonly use biometric data for identification purposes. One of the reasons UNHCR embraced biometric technologies was to address fraud, which Biometric identification depends on automated systems of algorithmic sorting.
Biometric identification occurs largely through artificial neural networks (ANN) which employ machine learning algorithms in order to process complex data inputs and learn to imitate the function of the human brain, for example in recognising patterns or shapes Bowyer and Burge 2016) . Recognition results vary depending on the type of algorithms used for processing (e.g., segmenting), or indexing the iris scan, as well as the algorithms and input data used for training the neural networks ). While it is beyond the scope of the article to include a technical discussion of neural networks, machine learning and AI are neither neutral nor objective, but depend on human decisions as well as the quality of datasets, which are always inherently incomplete (Buolamwini and Gebru 2018; Caliskan et al. 2017 ). AI is not just involved in the identification process, but also in the actual capturing and processing of biometric data (for example in the segmenting of the iris scan). It is for all these reasons that I argue that AI is integral to biometrics -there cannot be biometrics without AI -and why they both need to be understood as part of an assemblage which cannot be reduced to any of the constituent components.
Recently, as illustrated by the example which opened this article, biometrics have been combined with developments in blockchain, which is known as the technology behind bitcoins, but has a wider set of applications. Blockchains are distributed ledgers, or shared databases. Any participant on a blockchain network can submit and review 'blocks' of information in real time. For example, when a participant in the Building Blocks scheme records a new transaction, this is automatically replicated on all system nodes following biometric and algorithmic 7
verification. The network constantly reconciles information so that all users access the most up-to-date version of the blockchain. The distributed nature of information means that even if one node is shut down, the network will not be affected. This also means that no single user can control the whole network (GSMA 2017) . At the same time information cannot be deleted -new blocks can only be added. This -often praised -immutability of blockchain can have negative consequences if data entries are erroneous.
While public blockchains are better known (as they are used in cryprocurrency systems), private blockchains are also common and often preferred by humanitarian organisations as they only allow access to information to those granted permission.
The WFP Building Blocks scheme was initially launched on a public blockchain, but scalability problems relating to speed and cost shifted the project to a permissioned blockchain (Juskalian 2018 separately, in practice these intersect and overlap giving rise to dynamics that contribute to the shaping of the biometric assemblage and its consequences.
The logic of accountability
The first logic concerns the ongoing demand for humanitarian reform. For years humanitarianism has been criticized for a lack of accountability to affected people and for reproducing the power asymmetries on which it is based. Interactive technologies are seen as empowering refugees to voice their concerns and hold aid organisations into account (Madianou et al. 2016) . The demand for reform has driven the adoption of interactive technologies and has ultimately legitimated digital developments, including biometrics, within the sector. Biometrics are increasingly justified in the name of refugee protection and dignity in addition to improving the quality of assistance (for example, by freeing aid workers from time-consuming refugee registrations thus allowing them to focus on improving services). The logic of humanitarian reform also drives the use of biometrics in humanitarian cash transfers, which increasingly replace aid in-kind. Digital cash transfers are seen as empowering beneficiaries by giving them choice. Recent reports recommend the digital distribution of cash, which typically depend on biometric verification, for the added benefit of encouraging the financial inclusion of refugees. 6 These developments are enshrined in UNHCR's policy on 'digital identity' for all displaced people. 'Digital identity' is based on biometric data and is portable across borders in order to be used for access to jobs, remittances and banking (UNHCR 2018).
The logic of audit
One of the important structural transformations of the humanitarian sector has been the transformation of states into donors which demand evidence for the effectiveness of interventions (Krause 2014 benefits, such as increased visibility, access to data and opportunities to pilot new technologies (Jacobsen 2015) . The 'digital identity' policy by UNHCR (2018) discussed earlier has been largely driven by the private sector, which explains the emphasis on entrepreneurialism and web-based business opportunities (GSMA, 2018) .
The logic of solutionism
The logic of solutionism refers to the desire to find technological solutions to complex social problems. The logic of solutionism is closely linked to the logic of capitalism and the involvement of technology companies in the aid sector. The uses of data and digital technology in humanitarianism have been normalised to the extent that innovation has become synonymous with digital innovation (Madianou, in press ).
Given the complexity of humanitarian challenges, the desire to find solutions isn't surprising. Problems emerge when solutions are put before the understanding of the actual problems. Technological hype, often stirred by technology companies keen to promote their latest innovation, takes precedence over the meticulous assessment of situations which may not be suited to digital interventions. The desire to find solutions may be one of the factors driving experimentation with technology in the context of emergencies (Jacobsen 2015) .
The logic of securitization
States are inevitably involved in the response to displaced people. States host refugees and are keen to secure their borders as has been evident in the so-called European refugee crisis (Anderson 2014) . Biometric technologies are one method through which governments aim to control borders, detect 'anomalies' and ensure security (Aradau and Blanke 2017) by making populations legible (Scott 1998) . The logic of securitization reduces refugees to a security threat (Anderson 2014, 68) . In the humanitarian context, host governments often put pressure on intergovernmental agencies such as UNHCR to share data collected in a state's territory (Jacobsen 2015) .
On some occasions UNHCR conducts biometric registrations together with host states, or in some cases simply supports the hosts to carry out registrations. Such practices raise concerns about 'function creep', which refers to the way in which data collected for one purpose (e.g., to address fraud in aid delivery) may end up being used for an entirely different purpose (e.g., surveillance in order to combat terrorism) (Ajana 2013 ).
assemblage in the humanitarian response to displaced people. In fact, the logics are part of the assemblage, which is not only the result of technological convergence, but situated in a particular social, political and economic context. The following section, which provides a brief historical account of biometrics in the humanitarian sector, will illustrate how the intersecting logics have shaped past and contemporary developments.
Measuring refugee bodies: biometrics in the humanitarian sector
The use of biometrics has been championed by two UN Agencies, UNHCR and WFP. Race, gender, ethnicity, class, disability and age are produced through biometric technologies. Despite the assumption that biometrics are impartial and scientific, biometric data codify existing forms of discrimination (Magnet 2011 ) while the discourse of science masks racist, sexist and classist practices.
Biometric errors occur not just in the enrolment and processing of refugee data, but also at the level of matching biometric records. Because neural networks run on algorithms trained on data which contain human biases (Caliskan et al 2016) biometric identifications reproduce and therefore legitimate racial, gendered and other forms of discrimination. The probability of erroneous matches increases with large samples (Jacobsen 2015, 64) . While blockchain is mainly used for verification (rather than identification), which lessens the degree of algorithmic bias, its indelibility can accentuate any erroneous records as data are immutable once entered on blockchain.
This can have devastating consequences for the individual concerned as their claims to aid, asylum, family reunification and safety depend on their biometric records.
Although bias is not inherent to refugee biometrics, because these technologies are routinely deployed to identify 'suspect' bodies, 'the impact of technological failure manifests itself most consistently in othered communities' (Magnet 2011, 50) .
Lack of safeguards
The vulnerability of biometric databases is one of the most recognised risks in the debates on biometric data in humanitarian emergencies. Potential data breaches are, of course, inherent to all digital systems. The difference with refugee biometric data is their sensitive nature: the consequences could be devastating if they end up in the wrong hands. A data breach increases the vulnerability of displaced people and the risks of their data being used for discrimination, involuntary repatriation, resettlement or further persecution. There is ample evidence of data breaches in the humanitarian sector. A connectivity project in a refugee camp in Greece was subjected to up to 80,000 malware events every week during 2015 (Maitland and Bharania 2017) . In December 2017, the cloud server of 11 humanitarian agencies was hacked, potentially compromising the personal data of tens of thousands of vulnerable people (Raymond, Scarnecchia and Campo 2017) . Here cloud computing is added to the biometric assemblage as the remote storage of data increases the risk of data breaches.
Perhaps most damning are the criticisms from within the humanitarian sector regarding data security practices. An internal UN audit report identified serious breaches (e.g., leaving workstations unsupervised whilst publicly accessible) in the deployment of biometric registrations across five countries in 2016, which could 'lead to the loss or misuse of personal data of persons of concern' (OIOS 2016, 9). Despite conversations across the sector regarding responsible data practices, there's a conspicuous absence of clear policy on data practices and data security. The lack of policy is also reflected in wider issues regarding data sharing with governments and commercial partners.
Data sharing and function creep: surveillance and profit
A key feature of all digital data is their replicability and retrievability. Biometric records can be reproduced, shared and reused with great ease and these features are heightened by technological convergence (e.g., replicability is inherent to blockchain).
Given the sensitivity of refugee data and the fragile political contexts in which biometric registrations take place, the risk of data misuse can have grave consequences. This isn't necessarily the result of data breaches, but linked to the logic of securitization. Humanitarian organisations routinely share data with states under their cooperation agreements. All agencies including UNHCR operate under the jurisdiction of host nations, which put pressure to comply with data sharing requests (Jacobsen 2015) . The internal UN audit report not only reveals the routine nature of data sharing, but also an astonishing lack of safeguards. For example, not only did the UNHCR missions share the personal data of refugees with the governments of the Central African Republic, India and Thailand, they did not 'assess the level of data protection applied by the respective governments' nor did they obtain 'transfer agreements' (OIOS 2016, 11) .
Once data is shared, UNHCR or other agencies have no power over how the data may be stored or used in the future under different governments. Biometric data sharing can facilitate surveillance and function creep whereby the original purpose of data collection is different from subsequent uses (Ajana 2013) . Such concerns are heightened by the increasing interoperability of databases (Ajana 2013 ) and the technological convergence which underpins the assemblage. The absence of legal frameworks for data and privacy further compounds these risks.
Data sharing does not just occur with governments; private companies, which have been routinely involved in registrations since 2002, may also have access to data.
As we saw earlier, the 2017-8 UNHCR-Bangladesh government Rohingya registration was outsourced to a private vendor (Rahman 2017 partnerships acknowledged that they were aware that data-sharing took place in the practices opacity governs.
Ethics
Questions of ethics underpin almost every aspect of the discussion on risks so far.
This section scrutinizes questions of informed consent and the protection of refugee personal data. Informed consent is particularly problematic in biometric refugee registrations as opting out isn't a realistic option. Refusing to register with a humanitarian agency is to refuse aid -something displaced people can hardly afford.
Only those registered can be on distribution lists. The lack of alternatives for displaced people (as work and other opportunities are typically closed to them) can turn consent into coercion. The UN audit report confirms that the level of information provided to refugees was inadequate (OIOS 2016). The report is particularly critical with regards to whether persons of concern had been informed about the use of their data by government or third parties (for example, the vendor companies).
In four out of the five country operations reviewed, OIOS observed that the level of information provided to persons of concern during the biometric registration was below the standards required by [UNHCR] policy. There were also inconsistencies in the information provided, particularly regarding the access to the data by third parties.
[…] There was no evidence that persons of concern were informed of their rights and obligations […] (OIOS 2016, 10).
The infinite replicability of data through blockchain raises further concerns about data ownership and people's 'right to be forgotten'. It is not clear whether Building Blocks users are made aware how their data are replicated in the blockchain system. Given bias, data breaches and function creep are heightened as a result of the assemblage, the imperative for meaningful consent is stronger than ever.
Digital identity: who is it for?
The above discussion confirms that the already existing risks are amplified as a result Technological hype is a powerful force behind the rise of the biometric assemblage. Treating the refugee camp as a laboratory has a long history that can be traced back to colonial regimes. Elsewhere I argue that digital innovation in emergencies is a form of value extraction, which I term technocolonialism (Madianou, in press ).
Solutionism, Technological Hype and Experimentation
Jacobsen similarly highlights the experimental character of biometric registrations where 'the risk of experimentation failure is outsourced to the global periphery' (Jacobsen 2015, 31 As one of my interviewees remarked: 'No one would write an article about a wellwritten database, whereas Blockchain can make the biggest impact'. Whilst several of my humanitarian interviewees were critical of the prevalence of solutionism, that didn't stop the drive for experimentation. As one interviewee put it: 'refugees shouldn't be the first population to experiment on, they should be the last'.
It becomes apparent that 'digital identity' policies aren't about refugees after all; they are part of an experiment for the ultimate benefit of technology companies and other stakeholders. Digital identity is a neoliberal project that promises freedom and economic development, whilst contributing to systems of migration control and the accumulation of capital. Biometrics were already widespread as a result of the logics of audit and securitization. The logics of capitalism and solutionism have accelerated the implementation of the biometric assemblage while the logic of accountability provides a cloak of legitimacy: who doesn't want identity after all? The contrast here is between 'digital identity' as a neoliberal project and the actual constitution of biometric subjectivities.
Conclusion
The States also champion biometrics as part of the desire to make populations legible to them and to control the border from perceived 'undesirables'. The logic of securitization is evident in the data-sharing between UNHCR and host governments. Ultimately, the biometric assemblage accentuates power inequalities in the global context. 'Digital epidermalization', the imposition of race through algorithmic practices of measuring and matching (Browne 2015) , contributes to the enduring legacies of colonialism through which we can understand contemporary migration crises (De Genova 2016). While power asymmetries are immediately visible in refugee registrations, I argue that they are also present in the seemingly more empowering experience of 'shopping' through biometric data. The Building Blocks case can be seen as a gamified version of the logic of the camp -whereby the refugee submits their data -without knowing how these will be used and without the option to refuse -in order to be eligible for aid. The Building Blocks example exemplifies neoliberal humanitarianism as refugees are imagined as entrepreneurs with 'digital wallets', 'digital identities', ready to start a business, while the camp is rebranded as a place of opportunity.
Yet the reality is rather different. Whilst acknowledging refugee agency, the persistence of power asymmetries is impossible to ignore. The biometric assemblage is part of the digital systems of migration management, which control refugee mobility by constituting new types of traceable, 'digital bodies' which are open to additional forms of intervention and surveillance (see also Jacobsen 2015) . While refugee digital body parts travel through digital systems and databases, the actual
